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Abstract
This paper examines banks in Missouri during the Great Depression in order to find the
correct model specification for bank failure during economic downturns. The data set
controls for a bank’s balance sheet, correspondent network, charters and memberships,
county characteristics, and market share, and includes both Federal Reserve member and
non-member banks. Using a probit model, it is concluded that the contractionary monetary
policy employed by the St. Louis Federal Reserve did not help bank survival, as being a
member of the Federal Reserve had no significant effect on a bank’s probability of survival.
Additionally, while an increased network led to higher rates of bank survival, connections
to Chicago show evidence of contagion risk. Finally, the paper concludes that for future
model specification it is important to capture balance sheet, network, and environment
characteristics, as leaving out certain information can lead to omitted variable bias.
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I. Introduction
The Great Depression was an incredibly severe worldwide economic downturn that
originated in the United States during the late 1920s. Unemployment rose to nearly 25
percent, the stock market fell drastically, and nearly 40 percent of banks around the country
were suspended. While this disaster occurred nearly a century ago, experts still argue over
the true cause of the event. Many blame Black Tuesday in 1929; the culmination of a fourday period in which investors lost over $25 billion and the Dow dropped around 25 percent
(Suddath, 2008). While this may have been the tipping point, many other factors played a
role in instigating the downturn. Some critics blame the structure of capitalism, and claim
recessions are a mandatory part of the economy. Others look to decreases in aggregate
demand which lead to output declines. Regardless of the specific explanations, the collapse
of the banking system undoubtedly amplified the effects of the downturn (Cecchetti, 1992).

Figure 1: Number of U.S. Bank Failures between 1892 and 2008
Source: (Gorton, 2009)

1

During the Great Depression, spending decreased as the money supply fell, and it
became more difficult for borrowers to repay loans and for banks to make new loans.
Default rates skyrocketed, and banks were no longer returned the full outstanding loan
amount. Banks rely on depositor confidence, for they hold only a fraction of deposits in
reserves, and given that reserves pay no interest banks are incentivized to hold as few
reserves as possible. One of the ways banks can satisfy customer demands and survive
shaky depositor confidence is through borrowing; either from other banks, or from the
Federal Reserve. However, when all banks are experiencing high levels of withdrawal,
borrowing can be expensive or even impossible. Failure to meet depositor demand leads
to insolvency and bankruptcy (Gorton, 2009).

As seen in Figure 1, bank failure jumped

in the 1930s, peaking at over 4,000 banks in 1934. As more banks fail, existing banks
institute tighter lending policies, further restricting the economy.
This paper examines failure rates of banks in Missouri during the Great Depression.
Using bank information, financial ratios, and data from the 1930 census, I attempt to
determine the proper specification for modelling bank failure during economic downturns.
Previous studies of bank failure at this time focus on Federal Reserve member banks, as
databases from the Fed are often utilized. This paper includes data from non-member
banks, giving a unique perspective into understanding survival factors for all banks.
Additionally, it allows for the analysis of the effectiveness of the contractionary policy
used by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. As seen during the Great Depression, the failure of
the banking system can amplify otherwise concentrated economic problems. With the
proper specification for modeling bank failure, individuals could better determine the
characteristics most indicative of survival. With this knowledge, individuals could invest
2

in safer banks, and banks themselves could take on safer practices, decreasing the chance
of failing during economic downturns. Furthermore, regulatory policy could focus on
factors that help banks survive and lower systematic risk, therefore creating a safer banking
system.

3

II. History and Current Literature
Early Banking System
Since the 18th Century, the banking industry has been instrumental in controlling
the flow of money across the United States. In the mid-19th Century, with the country
preparing for the Civil War, Congress passed the National Banking Acts of 1863, 1864,
and 1865. The initial purpose of these Acts was to raise revenue for the upcoming war,
and unify the national currency, which was accomplished by requiring banks to invest a
certain portion of their capital into government bonds. Additionally, banks now had
reserve requirements, with reserves either held with the bank itself or with correspondents
(Sylla, 1969).
In the United States at the time, most banks were legally prevented from operating
branch systems, and instead the National Banking Act led to an inverted pyramid structured
reserve system. Country banks, the third tier, held deposits with banks in reserve cities,
sometimes up to three-fifths of their total reserves. These reserve city banks made up the
second tier, and would generally hold almost half of their reserves with banks in the top
tier, ones that resided in central reserve cities like New York City and Chicago. Banks
were incentivized to hold the maximum amount of reserves with correspondents, both
because these balances satisfied reserve requirements and due to the 2 percent interest
compared to 0 percent on traditional reserves (Bernstein et. al, 2009). In this way, funds
were able to flow throughout the country without the branch system that is used today.
In the early 1900s a large percentage of the economy focused on agriculture. Banks
were utilized to finance the planting of cotton in the South, and wheat and corn in the Great
Plains. Therefore, there was significant seasonal demand from these country banks as they
4

financed the planting and were repaid during the harvest. Carlson and Wheelock (2015)
analyzed the magnitude of this problem by looking at changes between call report dates in
deposits with national banks. They determined that country banks would generally
increase their deposits with city banks by 25 percent following the harvest, and pull out at
a similar rate prior to the harvest. This seasonal pressure on the system could cause crises
when shocks drove up the need for liquidity from country banks. For example, in 1907
country bank deposits decreased by 38 percent between May and December, and the
increased stress on the banks in reserve cities lead to the Panic of 1907. Seasonal pressures
regularly put stress on the banking system, and often led to banking panics (Carlson and
Wheelock, 2015).
According to Carlson and Wheelock (2017), the other significant issue facing the
banking system was the problem of contagion. Initially, the idea of an interbank network
was thought to help shield banks from illiquidity concerns, as these issues could be spread
across the correspondent networks. If banks faced pressure, they could draw on their
reserves held with a correspondent in a region not experiencing a panic. However, this
interconnectedness led to the amplification of regional panics. In the previous example,
extreme seasonal pressure could drive up liquidity stress in a few regions, which all drew
from central reserve cities in New York and Illinois.

These financial hubs faced

simultaneous pressure from around the country, and began restricting cash and limiting
lending. This amplified the effects even further, and passed the issue along to regions who
did not face the initial panic. Correspondent networks and the interbank market played a
role in distributing money across the country, but at the same time amplified the effects of
small shocks. (Carlson and Wheelock, 2017).
5

Establishment of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve was created to ease the burden on the central reserve city
banks, and halt any economic fallouts that occurred during these shocks. Established in
the early 1900s, the Fed was initially tasked with solving the both the seasonality and
contagion issues faced by banks (Carlson and Wheelock, 2015).
Following the creation of the Federal Reserve, banks now had the ability to meet
liquidity demands by using the discount window for loans. Carlson and Wheelock (2015)
examined the patterns of this discount window, and noticed that demand from country
banks was decidedly seasonal, indicating a reduction in seasonal demands between banks.
Following the harvest, country banks increased their deposits with correspondent cities by

Figure 2: First two principal components of due
from National Banks from Country Banks
(1894 – 1906)
Source: (Carlson and Wheelock, 2015)

Figure 3: First two principal components of due
from National Banks from Country Banks (1922
– 1928)
Source: (Carlson and Wheelock, 2015)

less than 10 percent, further proving the discount window decreased seasonal pressures in
the banking system. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the change in seasonal demand
between banks before and after the establishment of the Federal Reserve (Carlson and
Wheelock, 2015).
While the Federal Reserve succeeded in mitigating the issue of seasonality, there is
considerable discussion over the extent of contagion risk. Under the Federal Reserve Act,
national banks could no longer use correspondent balances to satisfy their reserve
6

requirements. Carlson and Wheelock (2017) argued that this helped lower the exposure to
shocks surrounding correspondents. To measure this, they used a system that compares an

Figure 4: Average vulnerability of country banks to a solvency shock in central reserve city
Source: (Carlson and Wheelock, 2017)

Figure 5: Average vulnerability of reserve city banks to a solvency shock in central reserve city
Source: (Carlson and Wheelock, 2017)

index of contagion risk to the index of the average vulnerability of country banks. Figure
4 plots the average vulnerability of country banks to a solvency shock originating in a
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central reserve city, and Figure 5 plots the same factor but for reserve city banks. The
lower the ratio, the less vulnerable the group of banks are to shocks in the respective city.
According to their study, the Federal Reserve greatly decreased the risk of contagion for
country banks and reserve city banks (Carlson and Wheelock, 2017).
Calomiris and Mason (1994) supported Carlson and Wheelock’s (2017) findings
by focusing on banks in Chicago during the Great Depression. In June of 1932, Chicago
experienced an extreme concentration of bank failures, resulting in what is now known as
the Chicago Banking Panic. Of the 49 banks that failed in June in Illinois, 40 were in
Chicago, and 26 were during one week.

While it would be easy to attribute this

concentrated failure to contagion, Calomiris and Mason (1994) argued this was not the
case. They compared the market-to-book value of equity, estimated probability of duration
of survival, composition of date, rates of withdrawal of debt, and interest rates paid on debt
between banks that failed and those that survived. The banks that failed during this period
were similar to ones that failed in other periods, and different from those that survived
during the Great Depression. These results led to their conclusion that contagion was not
the leading factor, and instead the failures were the result of a common weakness in certain
asset values (Calomiris and Mason, 1994).
Mitchener and Richardson (2016) developed a study arguing the opposite; that
contagion was an issue and amplified the impact of the Great Depression. In 1929 Federal
Reserve member banks held a combined $3.7 million in interbank deposits, which made
up 60 percent of aggregate reserves. Excess reserves held at the Fed were insignificant
compared to these interbank deposits. Additionally, over 40 percent of the aggregate
interbank balances were held in Chicago and New York City, indicating the high level of
8

concentration in these central reserve cities. In the study, it is estimated that there was an
overall 15 percent decline in lending solely because of these interbank connections,
providing evidence that contagion was still an issue during the Great Depression
(Mitchener and Richardson, 2016).
A previous study, by Calomiris and Mason (2003) helps put this number into
perspective regarding the total impact on the Great Depression. In their study, the two
authors utilized loan-supply shocks to estimate an aggregate decline in bank credit, and
linked this to income growth to measure the magnitude of the effect. They found that a
one standard deviation decrease in loan-supply growth can decrease income growth by
anywhere from 7 to 9 percent (Calomiris and Mason, 2003).
This study contributes to the ongoing discussion about contagion risk by including
three correspondent variables in the data set. The analysis of these variables will indicate
whether contagion was an issue for banks in Missouri at the time.

Structure and Policy of the Federal Reserve System
While the Federal Reserve succeeded in mitigating some of the existing issues, it
was created without the goal of uniting monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Act divided
the United States into 12 distinct regions, constructed based on economic conditions.
Originally, it was assumed that these regions would operate independently, and set their
own discount rates, as there was limited support for setting a national economic policy
(Federal Reserve). Therefore, neighboring regions could have vastly differing policies, as
was the case in St. Louis and Atlanta. In their study, Richardson and Troost (2009)
examine these two polar Federal Reserve Districts; Atlanta (6th) and St. Louis (8th). The
Atlanta Federal Reserve was a leader in money activism, using a rule coined by Walter
9

Bagehot that during financial downturns, central banks should extend credit to institutions
facing illiquidity problems. The goal would be to prevent increased withdrawal rates from
driving banks into bankruptcy. The St. Louis Federal Reserve accepted the idea that the
supply of credit should contract during recessions, as the lower level of economic activity
and production required less credit. During periods of panic, the St. Louis Fed limited
lending and contracted the money supply, and even sometimes required double collateral
on loans. Mississippi sat at the midpoint of the 6th and 8th Federal Reserve Districts, and
during the formation of the regions was split evenly between the two. This formation

Figure 6: Percentage of Banks in Business and in Operations in the 6 th and 8th Districts
Source: (Richardson and Troost, 2006)

created the setting for Richardson and Troost to compare the two policies in terms of bank
failure in a single state. During the first three weeks of the crisis, the Atlanta Fed increased
discounts to member banks by $2,800,000, and credit to member banks increased by over
10

$8,000,000. Comparatively, the St. Louis Fed discounts and credit declined by $2,100,000
and $11,800,000 respectively. As seen in Figure 6, banks in Mississippi within the 6th
District survived at significantly higher rates than those in the 8th District. Additionally,
the study finds that banks in the Atlanta region began an earlier recovery, and had less
financial contraction compared to banks in the St. Louis region (Richardson and Troost,
2009).
In this study, I focus on banks within Missouri, which all lie in the jurisdiction of
the St. Louis Federal Reserve (the 8th District). Part of the reason for this arises from data
limitations; compiling data from the entire country would take years. However, the more
important motive behind this is because of the specific policies mentioned above. The St.
Louis region enforced the most conservative monetary policy during the Great Depression,
and therefore experienced a large portion of the bank failures across the country. Focusing
on Missouri helps control for the specific monetary policy experienced by banks.
Additionally, Missouri provides a surprisingly impressive model for the entire United
States. Missouri contains a strong financial center in St. Louis (similar to New York for
the country), but also a wide variety of city and country banks. Therefore, any takeaways
for Missouri can provide insights about the entire country, while controlling for monetary
policy that differed at the time. This paper contributes to Richardson and Troost’s study
by examining all banks in Missouri and further investigating the effectiveness of the
conservative monetary policy deployed by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. The inclusion of
banks that were not members of the Federal Reserve allows for the comparison of member
and non-member banks, and the analysis of a Federal Reserve member variable. A positive
and significant variable would indicate the St. Louis Federal Reserve succeeded in
11

mitigating bank failure, while an insignificant variable would support Richardson and
Troost’s (2009) findings above.
This study most closely follows one published in 2013 regarding the effectiveness
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. While I do not discuss any effects from the
RFC, there are some key ideas used in the 2013 study that are utilized in this one. The
paper focuses on bank survival in the state of Michigan, citing the importance of the
Michigan banking crisis of 1933. The study employs a probit regression model, using
survival as a binary variable (0=failure, 1=survival), which is the model used in this study.
Additionally, many of the variables utilized in the paper are similar to ones outlined in
Table 1 in the next section. The number of correspondents, county population in 1930,
and the national bank indicator are a few of the variables that will be consistent across the
two studies. The number of correspondents variable, along with a few variations, helps
measure the level of interconnectedness for each bank, similar to the study done by
Mitchener and Richardson (2016). The study finds that the number of correspondents was
significant and positive in determining survival rates (and probability of an RFC loan)
while the number of correspondents in New York and Chicago variable was insignificant.
(Calomiris et. al, 2013).
While the model and variables will be similar, my paper contributes to the original
study by examining both Federal Reserve member and non-member banks. Calomiris et
al. (2013) used data from the Federal Reserve, and therefore was restricted solely to
member bank data. This gives the present study a much more diverse look at bank survival
during the period, and allows for greater analysis in looking at factors for survival across
all banks.
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III. Data
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the relevant characteristics for
examining bank failure during recessions. Data limitations have restricted many studies of
the Great Depression. As mentioned previously, this study uses data including non-Federal
Reserve member banks as well as members, which allows for analysis of the entire banking
population. The data set I will be using includes individual bank data from banks in
Missouri in 1929 and 1935, along with town and county characteristics. Table 1 identifies
the variables and their respective definitions.
Bank Survival
Age
Banks in Same Town
Correspondents
New York Correspondents
Illinois Correspondents
Federal Reserve Member

Dummy Variable for bank survival in 1935 (1=open, 0=closed)
Age of the bank in 1935
Number of banks in the same town
Total number of correspondent relationships with other banks
Total number of correspondent relationships with banks in New York
Total number of correspondent relationships with banks in Illinois
Dummy Variable indicating if the bank is a Federal Reserve member

Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loans / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

Natural log of the total deposits at the bank
Percentage of deposits the bank holds in the town
Loans divided by total deposits
Cash divided by total deposits
Loans divided by total assets
Bonds divided by total assets
Cash divided by total assets
Natural log of the total liabilities at the bank
Capital divided by total liabilities
Deposits divided by total liabilities
Surplus profits divided by (surplus profits plus capital)

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland

Natural log of the population of the town
Natural log of the amount of retail sales in the county
Natural log of the total acres of cropland in the county

Table 1: Variable Definitions

The data can be split into three subtypes: bank information, financial information,
and county information.

Bank information includes the age, charter, number of

competitors in the town, and network information. Financial data includes deposits and
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liabilities, along with a variety of ratios to indicate the current standing and health of the
bank. This information was collected from the Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory; a
biyearly book that compiled data from bank call reports, and included relevant financial
information, and a list of correspondents.1 These books were one of the only means to
access this information at the time, and were utilized to identify which banks individuals
wanted use for their own purposes. Bank survival is the dependent variable, comparing
the 1929 Rand McNally Banker’s Directory with the 1935 version and identifying which
banks are no longer in existence. The three correspondent variables demonstrate the
network for each bank, and explain its interconnectedness with other banks and with major
money centers in the United States. These three variables will help address the idea of
whether a large number of correspondents contributed to bank survival, or increased the
risk of contagion. The variety of other economic variables focus on the financial standing
of the bank.
The specific county information comes from the 1930 census. The census is
completed every 10 years, making the 1930s census closest to estimating county
information for 1929. The Census Bureau places a statutory 72-year restriction on the data,
which is what allows the of the access data from the 1930s census (National Archives).
Census data was downloaded from the University of Michigan Library Research Guide
(University of Michigan). This data allows for the examination of the economic structure
and environment of each bank’s county.

This information will help determine the

vulnerability of banks in the city versus out in the country. Table 2 outlines the summary
statistics for all of the banks in the study.

1

Data originally acquired and digitalized by Dr. Angela Vossmeyer
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The sample size includes 1,288 banks in Missouri in 1929. Of these banks, 48
percent of those alive in 1929 no longer existed in 1935. This is significantly more than
the estimated 40 percent of banks that suspended across the country, and is consistent with
the thought that the tight monetary policy enacted by the St. Louis Fed was detrimental to
the banking system in Missouri.

Mean Median

Standard
Maximum Minimum Count
Deviation
0.50
1.00
0.00 1288
19.57
135.00
6.00 1288
12.42
56.00
1.00 1288
1.46
21.00
0.00 1288
0.60
7.00
0.00 1288
0.64
4.00
0.00 1288
0.35
1.00
0.00 1288

Bank Survival
0.52
Age
33.19
Banks in Same Town
5.52
Correspondents
2.58
New York Correspondents 0.27
Illinois Correspondents
0.52
Federal Reserve Member
0.14

1.00
30.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loan / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

12.38
0.62
0.85
0.22
0.65
0.13
0.17
12.61
0.10
0.80
0.40

12.22
0.59
0.82
0.19
0.67
0.09
0.15
12.44
0.09
0.82
0.39

1.23
0.36
0.83
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.09
1.19
0.06
0.09
0.19

18.86
1.00
25.83
2.57
1.00
0.70
0.70
19.01
0.74
0.95
0.91

9.03
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.00
10.00
0.01
0.03
0.00

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland

6.93
15.51
11.86

6.46
15.22
11.95

1.95
1.23
0.44

13.65
19.72
12.68

3.37 1288
13.27 1288
10.04 1288

1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288
1288

Table 2: Summary Statistics for all banks

On average there were 6 banks in each town, but this was inflated by the 56 banks in St.
Louis in 1929. Most banks had between two and three correspondents, with twice as many
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being linked to banks in Illinois than New York. In total, 14 percent of the banks in this
study were Federal Reserve member banks. Table 3 and Table 4 provide summary
statistics for Federal Reserve member banks and non-member banks respectively.

Mean Median

Standard
Maximum Minimum Count
Deviation
0.49
1.00
0.00 183
22.76
135.00
6.00 183
23.32
56.00
1.00 183
2.64
21.00
1.00 183
1.11
7.00
0.00 183
0.74
4.00
0.00 183
0.00
1.00
1.00 183

Bank Survival
0.60
Age
36.71
Banks in Same Town
18.74
Correspondents
3.49
New York Correspondents 0.87
Illinois Correspondents
0.73
Federal Reserve Member
1.00

1.00
32.00
4.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loan / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

13.90
0.32
0.68
0.20
0.54
0.26
0.16
14.13
0.09
0.80
0.37

13.72
0.28
0.67
0.18
0.54
0.24
0.14
13.94
0.07
0.81
0.37

1.51
0.29
0.19
0.10
0.13
0.15
0.08
1.46
0.05
0.08
0.17

18.86
1.00
1.46
0.67
0.82
0.70
0.55
19.01
0.27
0.94
0.82

11.17
0.00
0.16
0.03
0.13
0.00
0.02
11.60
0.02
0.52
0.00

183
183
183
183
183
183
183
183
183
183
183

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland

9.33
15.67
11.93

8.34
15.17
11.98

2.78
1.26
0.33

13.65
19.72
12.68

5.42
13.75
10.96

183
183
183

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Federal Reserve Member Banks

Of the 1,288 banks used in this study, 183 of them were Federal Reserve member
banks. Over 60 percent of these banks survived through 1935, which is higher than the 52
percent for the study as a whole. On average, these Federal Reserve member banks were
four years older than non-member banks, and had an extra correspondent bank.
16

Mean Median

Standard
Maximum Minimum Count
Deviation
0.50
1.00
0.00 1105
18.94
135.00
6.00 1105
7.51
56.00
1.00 1105
1.09
7.00
0.00 1105
0.39
3.00
0.00 1105
0.61
3.00
0.00 1105
0.00
0.00
0.00 1105

Bank Survival
Age
Banks in Same Town
Correspondents
New York Correspondents
Illinois Correspondents
Federal Reserve Member

0.50
32.61
3.33
2.43
0.16
0.48
0.00

1.00
30.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loan / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

12.13
0.67
0.88
0.22
0.67
0.11
0.17
12.36
0.11
0.80
0.40

12.07
0.68
0.84
0.19
0.69
0.07
0.15
12.28
0.09
0.82
0.40

0.98
0.34
0.89
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.09
0.92
0.07
0.09
0.19

15.98
1.00
25.83
2.57
1.00
0.69
0.70
16.10
0.74
0.95
0.91

9.03
0.00
0.19
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.00
10.00
0.01
0.03
0.00

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland

6.53
15.49
11.84

6.28
15.22
11.92

1.43
1.22
0.45

13.65
19.72
12.68

3.37 1105
13.27 1105
10.04 1105

1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105
1105

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Non Federal Reserve Member Banks

Additionally, they were more than five times as likely to be connected to a bank in
New York. Generally, Federal Reserve member banks were located in more highly
populated cities, with non-member banks serving the countryside and smaller
communities. Unsurprisingly, banks connected with the Fed maintained more depositors,
but held a lower percentage of market share in the town compared to non-member banks.
These banks were also more highly levered, but held a larger percentage of cash.

17

Non Federal Reserve member banks on average had only three other banks in their
town. Surprisingly, they averaged less cropland in the respective counties than Federal
Reserve member banks, although this may be due to the sheer size of some of the towns.
In this data set, 50 percent of non-member banks survived during the Great Depression,
which is much lower than the rate of survival from member banks.
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IV. Methods
Probit Model
This paper implements a non-linear model for bank survival because the outcome
variable is not continuous. The framework follows a latent utility specification such that
𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜖 .
The latent variable, 𝑦𝑖∗ , is related to the observed outcome by the link function
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖∗ ≤ 0
𝑦𝑖 = {
.
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖∗ > 0
Specifically, the outcome variable measure as
𝑦𝑖 = {

0 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠
.
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙

The covariates that enter the vector 𝑥𝑖 include information on the bank i's balance sheet,
correspondent network, charters and memberships, county characteristics, and market
share. Several specifications for 𝑥𝑖 are considered in a model comparison setting, which is
discussed below. It is assumed that 𝜖~𝑁(0,1), thus this is a probit model.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The probit likelihood is
𝑛

𝑓(𝑦|𝛽) = ∏ Φ(𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽)𝑦𝑖 [1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽)]1−𝑦𝑖
𝑖=1

and the estimator is as follows
𝛽̂𝑀𝐿𝐸 ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ln 𝑓(𝑦|𝛽).

Marginal Effects
The impact of changing the jth covariate 𝑥𝑖 𝑗 on the outcome probability above can
be evaluated by marginal effects. The marginal effect (or derivative) with respect to 𝑥𝑖 𝑗 is
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∂Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽)
= 𝜙(𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽)𝛽𝑗 ,
𝜕𝑥𝑖 𝑗
where 𝜙 is the standard normal pdf. This shows that the effect of changing 𝑥𝑖 𝑗 depends on
the entire vector 𝑥𝑖 and all parameters 𝛽, and is nonlinear.

Model Comparison
Traditionally, fit measures and testing procedures are based on 𝑅 2 values, the sum
of the squared residuals, or the adjusted 𝑅 2 that penalizes the addition of variables.
However, both 𝑅 2 and adjusted 𝑅 2 are based on the underlying assumption that they are
fitting a linear model. As mentioned above, this paper implements a non-linear model
because of the binary dependent variable.
Instead, to perform model comparison, in this paper I utilize the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2 ln(𝐿) + 2𝐾
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2 ln(𝐿) + 𝐾𝑙𝑛(𝑛) ,
where K is the number of parameters in the model, L is the log likelihood, and n is the
sample size. One thing to note is that AIC and BIC are information criteria, not fit
measures. For these two criterion “smaller is better”, and a smaller AIC and BIC indicate
a better-fitting model (Greene, 2016).
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V. Results
Table 5 outlines the three main regressions run with the data. Using the model
selection procedure detailed above, the middle regression was best at representing the data,
recording an AIC of 1635. The full regression (with all 20 control variables) was second,
while the parsimonious regression had the worst fit with the data. This indicates that a few
controls in each category (location, network, and balance sheet) are necessary to have the
Full Regression

Middle Regression

Age
Banks in Same Town
Correspondents
New York Correspondents
Illinois Correspondents
Federal Reserve Member

Marginal
Standard
Effects
Error
0.004
0.030
-0.005 **
0.002
0.030 *
0.017
-0.074 *
0.043
-0.099 ***
0.028
0.008
0.054

Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loans / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

0.888
0.105
0.106
-0.338
0.136
0.979
1.328
-0.777
2.031
-0.487
0.762

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland

0.007
0.022
-0.093 **

AIC
BIC

*

***
**
***
***

0.979
0.060
0.118
0.322
0.335
0.311
0.523
0.977
0.516
1.271
0.126
0.014
0.015
0.036

Marginal
Standard
Effects
Error
0.003
0.030
-0.004 **
0.002
0.031 *
0.017
-0.075 *
0.043
-0.101 ***
0.028
0.015
0.054

Marginal
Effects

Standard
Error

-0.001

0.012

-0.041

0.050

0.116 ***
0.093 *

0.027
0.053

0.076 ***
0.124 **

0.023
0.051

0.716 ***
0.651 ***

0.126
0.174

0.613 ***

0.121

2.057 ***
0.576 **
0.777 ***

0.498
0.272
0.121

0.859 **

0.338

0.591 ***

0.098

0.020
-0.088 **

1643.812
1752.19

1635.986
1718.56

Table 5: Probit Regressions
Levels of Significance: *** = Significant at the 99% level
** = Significant at the 95% level
* = Significant at the 90% level
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Parsimonious Regression

0.014
0.036

-0.046
1679.81
1726.258

0.033

best fitting model. Additionally, the inclusion of too many financial variables can lead to
overfitting, as seen in the Full Regression. Therefore, the following discussion will focus
on the middle regression.
One of the biggest takeaways from the three regressions is the insignificance of the
Federal Reserve Member indicator variable. The Federal Reserve was founded as the
lender of last resort; with the purpose of preventing panics and limiting any crises that may
occur. The Fed mainly acted through discount window lending, but was also given other
tools to help act as the lender of last resort (Carlson and Wheelock, 2012). Theoretically,
having access to the discount window should have a significant effect on a bank’s survival
rate. Banks faced enormous pressure from depositors for access to funds, and the Fed
should have been able to ease some of this stress. However, being a member of the Federal
Reserve had no effect on bank survival in this study. One of the reasons for this could be
the restrictive policy pursued by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. As noted earlier, banks in
the St. Louis Fed’s region failed at higher rates than those in the Atlanta Fed’s district,
mostly due to the St. Louis Fed’s contractionary actions. The insignificance of this variable
points to the ineffectiveness of the St. Louis Federal Reserve, and of contractionary
monetary policy as a whole, which aligns with conclusions from Richardson and Troost’s
(2006) paper discussed earlier. If more expansionary monetary policy had been pursued,
banks would have theoretically seen a larger benefit for being a member of the Federal
Reserve, and more banks may have survived the crisis.
The three correspondents variables represent the interconnectedness of the bank,
and are all significant in the middle regression. Increasing the number of correspondents
by one would increase a bank’s chance of survival by around 3 percent. This indicates that
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a larger network can improve survival chances, and that the negatives of contagion may be
outweighed by the positives of a strong network. Both New York Correspondents and
Illinois Correspondents variables were negative (Illinois at the 99 percent level) indicating
that connections with banks in these cities may actually have negative effects on survival
rates. By adding another correspondent from Illinois, a bank actually decreased its chances
of survival by around 10 percent. This can most likely be explained by contagion from the
Chicago Banking Panic in 1932. In their study outlined previously, Calomiris and Mason
concluded that contagion played a limited role in bank failures in Chicago during the panic.
The findings in Table 5 somewhat contradict their conclusions, indicating that the panic in
Chicago affected corresponding banks outside of the state.
The Banks in Same Town variable had a significant negative correlation with bank
survival. The addition of another bank in a town decreased the chances of survival for
existing banks by 0.4 percent. This most likely arises from the increased competition as the
number of banks rises. Banks are forced to adopt more competitive, and often less
profitable, policies, and take on more risk to survive. This conclusion is enforced by the
% of Town Deposits variable, which was significant at the 90 percent level and positive,
indicating that having higher market share increases probability of survival. Balance sheet
data is aligned with expectations, with high levels of significance. Increasing a bank’s
bond ratio by 10 percent would lead to a 7 percent increase in probability of survival, while
a similar increase in the cash to assets ratio would have a 6.5 percent increase. Cash is the
most liquid asset on the balance sheets for banks, with bonds a close second, so increasing
holdings of these assets would help a bank meet any depositor demands. The largest effect
came from the capital to liabilities ratio, where an increase of 10 percent would lead to a
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20.5 percent increase in a bank’s probability of survival. In this data set, capital represents
paid up capital, which was owned by shareholders and can be thought of as a safe liability.
Therefore, if a bank experienced a run on the bank, the capital could be used as a buffer
against the increased demand for liquidity. One of the most surprising results came from
the Leverage variable, which is generally a risk measure, but had a significant and positive
relationship with bank survival. In this study, leverage is defined as surplus profits over
(surplus profits added to capital), where surplus profits include dividends and
contingencies. Therefore, a higher leverage rate can be thought of as an increase in credit
worthiness, as a larger dividend leads to more people trusting your bank and investing.
Retail Sales in the county were insignificant in predicting bank failure rates, while
Cropland was significant at the 95 percent level, but had a negative effect on bank survival.
Generally, agricultural stress preceded banking stress, explaining the negative correlation
between cropland and bank survival. Additionally, banks in areas with large amounts of
cropland were often small country banks, with smaller balance sheets. These banks were
therefore more susceptible to shocks, and had an increased risk of failure during the Great
Depression.

Additional Considerations
One of the important factors of this regression is the variety of control variables.
With the data, the study controls for a bank’s balance sheet, correspondent network,
charters and memberships, county characteristics, and market share. The purpose of this
section is to demonstrate the biases that can occur when categories of these variables are
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missing. Table 6 details three different regressions using only bank information, balance
sheet data, and county details in the respective regressions.
Bank Information
Regression
Marginal
Standard
Effects
Error
Age
0.08120 *** 0.02664
Banks in Same Town
-0.00003
0.00148
Correspondents
0.04278 *** 0.01566
New York Correspondents -0.00886
0.04006
Illinois Correspondents
-0.09779 *** 0.02593
Federal Reserve Member
0.07869 *
0.04549
Deposits
% of Town Deposits
Loans / Deposits
Cash / Deposits
Loans / Assets
Bonds / Assets
Cash / Assets
Liabilities
Capital / Liabilities
Deposits / Liabilities
Leverage

Financial Regression

County Regression

Marginal
Effects

Marginal
Effects

0.7084
0.1193
0.0932
-0.3224
0.0938
0.8941
1.2896
-0.6387
1.9013
-0.1767
0.7851

Standard
Error

**

***
**
***
***

Town Population
Retail Sales
Cropland
AIC
BIC

Standard
Error

0.9516
0.0510
0.1147
0.3208
0.3277
0.3018
0.5127
0.9511
0.5023
1.2289
0.1181
0.0202 ***
0.0265 **
-0.0592 *

1759.932
1796.058

1658.129
1720.059

0.0073
0.0122
0.0339

1778.371
1799.014

Table 6: Categorical Probit Regressions
Levels of Significance: *** = Significant at the 99% level
** = Significant at the 95% level
* = Significant at the 90% level

In a specification with only bank information, half of the variables are significant
at the 99% level. Looking at this regression, one would erroneously assume that Federal
Reserve membership is significant for determining bank survival, and possibly make the
conclusion that the actions taken by the St. Louis Federal Reserve were beneficial for
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banks. Due to the data limitations, many studies of the Great Depression fail to include all
pertinent information for banks, either excluding certain financial data or environmental
characteristics.

Failing to include this information could lead to ineffective future

monetary policy, as policy makers would erroneously make the conclusion that the
conservative monetary policy was successful at mitigating bank failure. This exhibits the
omitted variable bias that can occur when a study fails to control for balance sheet data and
other information. This specification had an AIC of 1760, which is significantly higher
than any of the three regression in Table 5, indicating it does a poor job of representing the
data.
The second regression only controls for financial information, and is the best of the
three specifications in Table 6 according to the Akaike Information Criterion. Despite this,
similar problems of omitted variable bias occur in this specification. Deposits (total and
as a percentage of liabilities) appear to be insignificant, while in actuality both are
significant at the 99 percent level. Regardless of the importance of balance sheet data, this
specification shows that other information must be considered beyond financials.
The final regression controls only for county information, and once again, these
results would lead to erroneous conclusions. Town population appears to be significant at
the 99 percent level, along with Retail Sales at the 95 percent level. We find positive and
significant effects from both of these variables, while in actuality they are insignificant,
demonstrating an upward bias. Both of these variables are insignificant when controlling
for balance sheet data, bank information, and market share data, because bank size is
captured separately from town size.
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The results in Table 6 highlight the importance of capturing all elements of bank
information. While balance sheet data appears to be the most important, and network
information often leads to the most impactful analysis, other factors can play a significant
role in bank failure and survival. Many studies only include network models, and fail to
control for changes in the county. While data restrictions can often be the cause of these
specification limitations, for a true model of bank survival a variety of variables must be
considered. This highlights the importance of model comparison in economic studies, as
models missing certain information may lead to erroneous results and conclusions.
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VI. Conclusions
This paper attempts to find the proper specification for bank failure during
economic downturns. The data used in this study includes both Federal Reserve member
banks, and non-member banks, and controls for a bank’s balance sheet, correspondent
network, charters and memberships, county characteristics, and market share. The results
and analysis, above, can have important implications for future studies and future policy
decisions.
For future studies, accounting for a bank’s network is integral for understanding its
risk of failure. As seen in the Middle Regression in Table 5, a connection with a bank in
Illinois had extremely significant negative effects on a bank’s survival rate. While the
introduction of the Federal Reserve did help mitigate some of the contagion risk, clearly
this was still a factor, as the Chicago Banking Panic contributed to bank failures in
Missouri. Therefore, when attempting to model bank failure in the future it will be
important to account for a bank’s network, as this can vastly affect survival rates.
This study also found evidence that confirmed the shortcomings of Federal Reserve
policy in the 8th district, originally discussed by Richardson and Troost (2009). Having
access to the discount window offered by the Federal Reserve should in theory give a bank
an advantage during an economic downturn. Given that this study includes both Fed
member and non-member banks, it would be expected that these banks have vastly
different survival rates. Instead, results showed an insignificant Federal Reserve member
variable, indicating there was no difference between survival rates of these two types of
banks. This most likely is a representation of the ineffectiveness of the conservative
monetary policy pursued by the St. Louis Fed, and has far-reaching implications for the
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Federal Reserve.

Clearly, Fed policy during an economic downturn should not be

stringent, and should more closely follow actions the taken by the Atlanta Federal Reserve
during the Great Depression of extending credit to institutions facing illiquidity problems.
Finally, the regressions shown in Table 6 display the importance of capturing all
elements of a banks environment. It is tempting to solely examine the balance sheet in an
attempt to detect future insolvency, but other factors like network collapses and changes in
the local area can have significant effects. The absence of this information in the regression
leads to nontrivial omitted variable bias, and can have drastic implications on future
banking policy. In this study, without controlling for balance sheet information and
environmental factors, one would erroneously make the conclusion that the St. Louis
Federal Reserve’s contractionary monetary policy was beneficial for banks in Missouri. In
order to have a better model specification for bank failure, and avoid omitted variable bias,
all factors of a bank’s environment need to be considered.
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